Are Communication Skills, Emotion Regulation and Theory of Mind Skills Impaired in Adolescents with Developmental Dyslexia?

This study investigates pragmatic language impairment, Theory of Mind (ToM), and emotion regulation in adolescents with Developmental Dyslexia(DD). The Social Responsiveness Scale-2(SRS) and Children's Communication Checklist-2(CCC-2) scores were found to be statistically significantly higher in the DD group than in healthy controls. DD group had lower performance in ToM skills and they have more difficulties in emotion regulation. We also found that CCC-2 and ToM scores were significantly correlated in adolescents with DD. These results may be important in understanding the difficulties experienced in social functioning and interpersonal relationships in adolescents with DD.

Pragmatic Skills in Late Adulthood.

Research investigating pragmatic abilities in healthy aging suggests that both production and comprehension might be compromised; however, it is not clear how pragmatic abilities evolve in late adulthood, as well as when difficulties are more likely to arise. The aim of this study is to investigate the decline of pragmatic skills in aging, and to explore what cognitive and demographic factors support pragmatic competence. We assessed pragmatic production skills, including discourse abilities such as speech, informativeness, information flow, paralinguistic aspects, as well as the ability to produce informative descriptions of pictures, and pragmatic comprehension skills, which encompassed the ability to understand discourse and the main aspects of a narrative text, to infer non-literal meanings and to comprehend verbal humor in a group of elderly individuals and in a sample of younger participants. Moreover, specific cognitive functions (short-term memory, verbal and visuospatial working memory, inhibition Theory of Mind, and Cognitive Reserve) were assessed in both groups. Pragmatic difficulties seem to occur in late adulthood, likely around 70 years, and emerge more prominently when participants are asked to understand verbal humor. Age was the only predictor of general pragmatic performance in a sample of cognitively unimpaired older adults; conversely, when elderly individuals with less intact inhibitory control are considered, a general role of inhibition emerged, in addition to working memory and ToM in specific tasks.

Agreeableness modulates mental state decoding: Electrophysiological evidence.

Agreeableness is one of the five personality traits which is associated with theory of mind (ToM) abilities. One of the critical processes involved in ToM is the decoding of emotional cues. In the present study, we investigated whether this process is modulated by agreeableness using electroencephalography (EEG) while taking into account task complexity and sex differences that are expected to moderate the relationship between emotional decoding and agreeableness. This approach allowed us to identify at which stage of the neural processing agreeableness kicks in, in order to distinguish the impact on early, perceptual processes from slower, inferential processing. Two tasks were employed and submitted to 62 participants during EEG recording: the reading the mind in the eyes (RME) task, requiring the decoding of complex mental states from eye expressions, and the biological (e)motion task, involving the perception of basic emotional actions through point-light body stimuli. Event-related potential (ERP) results showed a significant correlation between agreeableness and the contrast for emotional and non-emotional trials in a late time window only during the RME task. Specifically, higher levels of agreeableness were associated with a deeper neural processing of emotional versus non-emotional trials within the whole and male samples. In contrast, the modulation in females was negligible. The source analysis highlighted that this ERP-agreeableness association engages the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Our findings expand previous research on personality and social processing and confirm that sex modulates this relationship.

Adverse childhood experiences differently affect Theory of Mind brain networks in schizophrenia and healthy controls.

Patients with schizophrenia (SZ) show impairments in both affective and cognitive dimensions of theory of mind (ToM). SZ are also particularly vulnerable to detrimental effect of adverse childhood experiences (ACE), influencing the overall course of the disorder and fostering poor social functioning. ACE associate with long-lasting detrimental effects on brain structure, function, and connectivity in regions involved in ToM. Here, we investigated whether ToM networks are differentially affected by ACEs in healthy controls (HC) and SZ, and if these effects can predict the disorder clinical outcome. 26 HC and 33 SZ performed a ToM task during an fMRI session. Whole-brain functional response and connectivity (FC) were extracted, investigating the interaction between ACEs and diagnosis. FC values significantly affected by ACEs were entered in a cross-validated LASSO regression predicting Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS), Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI), and task performance. ACEs and diagnosis showed a widespread interaction at both affective and cognitive tasks, including connectivity between vmPFC, ACC, precentral and postcentral gyri, insula, PCC, precuneus, parahippocampal gyrus, temporal pole, thalamus, and cerebellum, and functional response in the ACC, thalamus, parahippocampal gyrus and putamen. FC predicted the PANSS score, the fantasy dimension of IRI, and the AToM response latency. Our results highlight the crucial role of early stress in differentially shaping ToM related brain networks in HC and SZ. These effects can also partially explain the clinical and behavioral outcomes of the disorder, extending our knowledge of the effects of ACEs.

Risk factors for internalizing symptoms: The influence of empathy, theory of mind, and negative thinking processes.

Internalizing symptoms such as elevated stress and sustained negative affect can be important warning signs for developing mental disorders. A recent theoretical framework suggests a complex interplay of empathy, theory of mind (ToM), and negative thinking processes as a crucial risk combination for internalizing symptoms. To disentangle these relationships, this study utilizes neural, behavioral, and self-report data to examine how the interplay between empathy, ToM, and negative thinking processes relates to stress and negative affect. We reanalyzed the baseline data of N = 302 healthy participants (57% female, Mage = 40.52, SDage = 9.30) who participated in a large-scale mental training study, the ReSource project. Empathy and ToM were assessed using a validated fMRI paradigm featuring naturalistic video stimuli and via self-report. Additional self-report scales were employed to measure internalizing symptoms (perceived stress, negative affect) and negative thinking processes (rumination and self-blame). Our results revealed linear associations of self-reported ToM and empathic distress with stress and negative affect. Also, both lower and higher, compared to average, activation in the anterior insula during empathic processing and in the middle temporal gyrus during ToM performance was significantly associated with internalizing symptoms. These associations were dependent on rumination and self-blame. Our findings indicate specific risk constellations for internalizing symptoms. Especially people with lower self-reported ToM and higher empathic distress may be at risk for more internalizing symptoms. Quadratic associations of empathy- and ToM-related brain activation with internalizing symptoms depended on negative thinking processes, suggesting differential effects of cognitive and affective functioning on internalizing symptoms. Using a multi-method approach, these findings advance current research by shedding light on which complex risk combinations of cognitive and affective functioning are relevant for internalizing symptoms.

Linearly integrating speed and accuracy to measure individual differences in theory of mind: Evidence from autistic and neurotypical adults.

It has long been theorised that there is a direct link between individual differences in social cognition and behaviour. One of the most popular tests of this theory has involved examination of Theory of Mind (ToM) difficulties in Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). However, evidence for associations between ToM and social behaviour is mixed, both when testing the ToM explanation of ASD and when investigating individual differences in ToM in the general population. We argue that this is due to methodological limitations of many ToM measures, such as a lack of variability in task performance, inappropriate non-ToM control tasks, and a failure to account for general mental ability. To overcome these issues, we designed a novel task, which probed individual differences in ToM fluency through mental state attribution in response to cartoons (Cartoons Theory of Mind [CarToM] task). This task, enabling the linear combination of speed and accuracy, was used to quantify ToM ability and its association with self-reported (a)typical social behaviour in adults with and without ASD. In a large sample (N = 237), we found that having an ASD diagnosis and higher autistic traits predicted lower ToM ability, even after accounting for performance on a well-matched non-ToM condition and general mental ability. Overall, our findings provide fresh support for the existence of a link between individual differences in social cognition (specifically, ToM) and behaviour (specifically, autism). This has implications for social-cognitive theory and research, allowing large-scale, online assessment of individual differences in ToM in clinical groups and the general population.

Interpreting the results of explicit and applied theory of mind collectively in autistic children: A solution from Rasch analysis.

LAY ABSTRACT: Theory of mind is an ability to infer others' mental states, which is a foundation for generating appropriate social responses. Theory of mind can be conceptually divided into two related but distinguishable constructs: explicit theory of mind (conceptual knowledge/information about others' mental states) and applied theory of mind (the ability to use theory of mind skills in real-life contexts). Although these two theory of mind scores can be described by the percentages of children in the early, basic, and advanced developmental stages, the resulting information may not be sufficient to determine the corresponding relationships between these two theory of mind constructs or identify children with mismatched theory of mind abilities (e.g. children who have difficulty in effectively applying their theory of mind knowledge in real-life contexts). To resolve these limitations, methods for simultaneously interpreting the relationships between the two theory of mind scores are proposed. Based on the findings, each applied theory of mind score can reflect multiple scores of explicit theory of mind. In particular, the results do not take measurement error into consideration, which would make them more ambiguous. Therefore, the scores of applied theory of mind should be interpreted carefully, given that children who have the same applied theory of mind score may actually have high or low explicit theory of mind. Regarding the method for joint interpretation, cutoff scores were selected to identify children who have mismatched theory of mind abilities (high explicit theory of mind with low applied theory of mind or low explicit theory of mind with high applied theory of mind) and determine the priority for interventions.

Rethinking egocentric bias: A computer mouse-tracking study of adult belief processing.

Several theories of belief processing assume that processing another's false belief requires overcoming an egocentric bias toward one's current knowledge. The current evidence in support of this claim, however, is limited. In order to investigate the presence of egocentric bias in adult belief processing, computer mouse tracking was used across three experiments to measure attraction toward response options reflecting one's current knowledge while reporting a false belief. Participants viewed scenarios in which an agent either had a true belief or a false belief about the location of a set of keys. Participants used a mouse to answer reality questions "where are the keys currently hidden?" and belief questions "where does she think the keys are?" Mouse-tracking measures indexing attraction toward response options during decision making were measured, along with time taken to make a response and accuracy. Experiment 1 found no evidence, in any measures, that participants showed a bias toward their own knowledge when reporting another's false belief. Experiment 2 investigated whether differences in event timings between true belief and false belief scenarios in Experiment 1 masked an egocentric bias. Experiment 3 investigated whether the lack of egocentric bias could be explained by participants prioritizing encoding the other's beliefs. Neither follow-up experiment found evidence supporting the presence of an egocentric bias. Overall, contrary to many theories of belief processing, our results suggest that adults are readily able to process other people's beliefs without having to overcome a default bias toward their own knowledge. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Social cognition deficits in borderline personality disorder: Clinical relevance.

Interpersonal difficulties in borderline personality disorder (BDP) have been suggested to be related to impairments in Social Cognition (SC), mainly due to deficits in Theory of Mind (ToM). However, literature is scarce and ambiguous. This work aims to study the SC impairments in BPD patients, by the specific assessment of ToM deficits, and to investigate the relationship between these SC impairments and clinical variables. 82 BPD patients with BPD and 47 control subjects were assessed with the Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition (MASC). Clinical variables of severity, chronicity, functionality and anxious-depressive symptomatology were recorded. BPD patients had fewer correct mentalization responses and more overmentalization, undermentalization, and absence of mentalization errors than controls. Chronicity was negatively correlated with overmentalization and positively correlated with undermentalization and absence of mentalization errors. Functionality was indirectly correlated with absence of mentalization. These results confirm previous reports of alterations in SC in BPD patients. Furthermore, this study shows that SC impairments in patients with BPD are dependent on characteristics such as chronicity or degree of functionality. The different ToM profiles in patients with BPD indicate the necessity of developing variants of mentalization therapy depending on the deficits of each patient.

Theory of mind and executive dysfunction in chronic inflammatory demyelinating polyneuropathy.

BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE: Although chronic inflammatory demyelinating polyneuropathy (CIDP) is understood as a disease affecting the peripheral nervous system, mild cognitive dysfunction, particularly in the executive domain, has been described to form part of the condition. Here our interest lay in CIDP-related theory of mind (ToM) capacities as an aspect of social cognition relevant for many aspects of everyday life. METHODS: Twenty-nine patients with CIDP and 23 healthy controls participated in this study. They were subjected to overview cognitive testing, different executive function (EF) tasks, as well as to the Faux Pas Recognition Task (FPRT) for assessing cognitive ToM and the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET) with respect to affective ToM. RESULTS: Persons with CIDP and controls did not differ with respect to their overall cognitive state. However, in the German verbal fluency standard, the digit span forward and the digit span backward tests used as EF tasks patients performed significantly worse than controls. Further, performance was abnormally low in the FPRT, whilst the groups did not differ with respect to RMET results. The FPRT and digit span backward results correlated with each other. CONCLUSIONS: Patients with CIDP showed deficits in cognitive ToM performance together with EF dysfunction, whilst affective ToM was preserved. Altogether, the results suggest that low cognitive ToM capacities in patients with CIDP arise as a particular aspect of disease-related executive dysfunction.

Evidence against implicit belief processing in a blindfold task.

Understanding what other people think is crucial to our everyday interactions. We seem to be affected by the perspective of others even in situations where it is irrelevant to us. This intrusion from others' perspectives has been referred to as altercentric bias and has been suggested to reflect implicit belief processing. There is an ongoing debate about how robust such altercentric effects are and whether they indeed reflect true mentalizing or result from simpler, domain-general processes. As a critical test for true mentalizing, the blindfold manipulation has been proposed. That is, participants are familiarized with a blindfold that is either transparent or opaque. When they then observe a person wearing this blindfold, they can only infer what this person can or cannot see based on their knowledge of the blindfold's transparency. Here, we used this blindfold manipulation to test whether participants' reaction times in detecting an object depended on the agent's belief about the object's location, itself manipulated with a blindfold. As a second task, we asked participants to detect where the agent was going to look for the object. Across two experiments with a large participant pool (N = 234) and different settings (online/lab), we found evidence against altercentric biases in participants' response times in detecting the object. We did, however, replicate a well-documented reality congruency effect. When asked to detect the agent's action, in turn, participants were biased by their own knowledge of where the object should be, in line with egocentric biases previously found in false belief reasoning. These findings suggests that altercentric biases do not reflect belief processing but lower-level processes, or alternatively, that implicit belief processing does not occur when the belief needs to be inferred from one's own experience.

Neural mechanism underlying the beneficial effect of Theory of Mind psychotherapy on early-onset schizophrenia: a randomized controlled trial.

BACKGROUND: Psychosocial interventions have emerged as an important component of a comprehensive therapeutic approach in early-onset schizophrenia, typically representing a more severe form of the disorder. Despite the feasibility and efficacy of Theory of Mind (ToM) psychotherapy for schizophrenia, relatively little is known regarding the neural mechanism underlying its effect on early-onset schizophrenia. METHODS: We performed a randomized, active controlled trial in patients with early-onset schizophrenia, who were randomly allocated into either an intervention (ToM psychotherapy) or an active control (health education) group. Diffusion tensor imaging data were collected to construct brain structural networks, with both global and regional topological properties measured using graph theory. RESULTS: We enrolled 28 patients with early-onset schizophrenia in our study. After 5 weeks of treatment, both the intervention and active control groups showed significant improvement in psychotic symptoms, yet the improvement was greater in the intervention group. Importantly, in contrast with no brain structural network change after treatment in the active control group, the intervention group showed increased nodal centrality of the left insula that was associated with psychotic symptom improvement. LIMITATIONS: We did not collect important information concerning the participants' cognitive abilities, particularly ToM performance. CONCLUSION: These findings suggest a potential neural mechanism by which ToM psychotherapy exerts a beneficial effect on early-onset schizophrenia via strengthening the coordination capacity of the insula in brain structural networks, which may provide a clinically translatable biomarker for monitoring or predicting responses to ToM psychotherapy.Clinical trial registration: NCT05577338; ClinicalTrials.gov.

The Causal Role of Temporoparietal Junction in Mediating Self-Other Mergence during Mentalizing.

Mentalizing is a core faculty of human social behaviors that involves inferring the cognitive states of others. This process necessitates adopting an allocentric perspective and suppressing one's egocentric perspective, referred to as self-other distinction (SOD). Meanwhile, individuals may project their own cognitive states onto others in prosocial behaviors, a process known as self-other mergence (SOM). It remains unclear how the two opposing processes coexist during mentalizing. We here combined functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) techniques with intranasal oxytocin (OTint) as a probe to examine the SOM effect in healthy male human participants, during which they attributed the cognitive states of decision confidence to an anonymous partner. Our results showed that OTint facilitated SOM via the left temporoparietal junction (lTPJ), but did not affect neural representations of internal information about others' confidence in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, which might be dedicated to SOD, although the two brain regions, importantly, have been suggested to be involved in mentalizing. Further, the SOM effect induced by OTint was fully mediated by the lTPJ activities and became weakened when the lTPJ activities were suppressed by rTMS. These findings suggest that the lTPJ might play a vital role in mediating SOM during mentalizing.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Every human mind is unique. It is critical to distinguish the minds of others from the self. On the contrary, we often project the current mental states of the self onto others; that is to say, self-other mergence (SOM). The neural mechanism underlying SOM remains unclear. We here used intranasal oxytocin (OTint) as a probe to leverage SOM, which is typically suppressed during mentalizing. We revealed that OTint specifically modulated the left temporoparietal junction (lTPJ) neural activities to fully mediate the SOM effect, while suppressing the lTPJ neural activities by transcranial magnetic stimulations causally attenuated the SOM effect. Our results demonstrate that the lTPJ might mediate SOM during social interactions.

The neurobiological map of theory of mind and pragmatic communication in autism.

Children with autism often have difficulty with Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to infer mental states, and pragmatic skills, the contextual use of language. Neuroimaging research suggests ToM and pragmatic skills overlap, as the ability to understand another's mental state is a prerequisite to interpersonal communication. To our knowledge, no study in the last decade has examined this overlap further. To assess the emerging consensus across neuroimaging studies of ToM and pragmatic skills in autism, we used coordinate-based activation likelihood estimation (ALE) analysis of 35 functional magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) studies (13 pragmatic skills, 22 ToM), resulting in a meta-analysis of 1,295 participants (647 autistic, 648 non-autistic) aged 7 to 49 years. Group difference analysis revealed decreased left inferior frontal gyrus (LIFG) activation in autistic participants during pragmatic skills tasks. For ToM tasks, we found reduced anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), and temporoparietal junction (TPJ) activation in autistic participants. Collectively, both ToM and pragmatic tasks showed activation in IFG and superior temporal gyrus (STG) and a reduction in left hemispheric activation in autistic participants. Overall, the findings underscore the cognitive and neural processing similarities between ToM and pragmatic skills, and their underlying neurobiological differences in autism.

Emotion dysregulation and social communication problems but not ToM properties may predict obsessive-compulsive disorder symptom severity.

OBJECTIVE: Studies have shown that theory of mind, emotion regulation and pragmatic abilities are negatively affected in people with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). We aimed to investigate theory of mind (ToM) abilities, social responsiveness, pragmatic language, and emotion regulation skills in children with OCD and to compare them to healthy controls. METHODS: This study was designed as a single-center, cross-sectional, case-control study. ToM abilities were evaluated via "Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test" (RMET), "Faces Test", "Faux-Pas Test", "Comprehension Test" and "Unexpected Outcomes Test". Social responsiveness, pragmatic language and emotion regulation were evaluated by Social Responsiveness Scale (SRS), Children's Communication Checklist- Second Edition (CCC-2), Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS) and Children's Yale-Brown Obsessive-Compulsive Scale (CY-BOCS). Within the study period, we enrolled 85 adolescents (42 with OCD and 43 controls). RESULTS: The OCD group performed significantly lower than healthy controls in the Faux Pass and Comprehension tests (p = 0.003 for both). We found a statistically significant difference between groups in terms of the goal, strategy, non-acceptance subscales of the DERS (p < 0.001, p = 0.006, p = 0.008, respectively) as well as the total DERS score (p < 0.001). CY-BOCS total scores correlated significantly and negatively with Comprehension, Faux Pas and Unexpected Outcomes tests, and positively with CCC total, SRS total and DERS total scores. In regression analysis the DERS, SRS and CCC tests emerged as significant predictors of CY-BOCS total score. CONCLUSION: Addressing ToM, pragmatic, and ER difficulties when planning the treatment of young people with OCD may contribute to positive outcomes.

Beyond the simplicity of theory of mind deficit in multiple sclerosis: from kinetic perception to socio-emotional abstraction and mentalizing.

BACKGROUND: Theory of Mind (ToM) processing in Multiple Sclerosis (MS) is still poorly understood due to the difficulty of most tasks in qualifying the mentalizing deficit net of cognitive load. METHODS: In this study, we administered the New False Belief Animation Task (NFBAT) to 50 MS and 33 healthy controls (HC) to investigate spontaneous mentalizing in ToM and goal-directed interactions. The global cognitive level was assessed by the Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MoCA). NFBAT appropriateness and intentionality scores were computed to investigate the ToM accuracy and intentionality attribution difficulties. NFBAT answers were qualitatively analyzed and categorized into kinetically and socially coherent/not coherent responses to test a low-level perceptual deficit. RESULTS: The main result showed dysfunctional mentalizing reasoning in MS compared to HC in the NFBAT Intentionality score in ToM conditions (p = 0.028, d = 0.501), while the two groups were equally proficient in mentalization accuracy. The Intentionality underperformance in MS was related to social low-level perceptual processing (ß =0.06, p < 0.001) and visuospatial functions (ß =0.05, p =0.002). A predictive role of memory and executive functions on NFBAT Intentionality scores was not observed. CONCLUSION: These results strengthen the hypothesis that ToM in MS is likely related to low-level social processing.

Differences in self-other control as cognitive mechanism to characterize theory of mind reasoning in autistic and non-autistic adults.

In cognitive science, altered Theory of Mind is a central pillar of etiological models of autism. Yet, recent evidence, showing comparable Theory of Mind abilities in autistic and non-autistic people, draws a more complex picture and renders previous descriptions of Theory of Mind abilities in autism and their role in autistic symptomatology insufficient. Here, we addressed self-other control as a potential candidate cognitive mechanism to explain subtle Theory of Mind reasoning differences between autistic and non-autistic adults. We investigated flexible shifting between another's and one's own congruent or incongruent points of view, an ability that is important for reciprocal social interaction. Measuring response accuracy and reaction time in a multiple-trial unexpected location false belief task, we found evidence for altered self-other control in Theory of Mind reasoning in autistic adults, with a relative difficulty in flexibly considering the other's perspective and less interference of the other's incongruent viewpoint when their own perspective is considered. Our results add to previous findings that social cognitive differences are there but subtle and constitute one step further in characterizing Theory of Mind reasoning in autism and explaining communication and interaction difficulties with non-autistic people in everyday life.

Functional role of the theory of mind network in integrating mentalistic prior information with action kinematics during action observation.

Inferring intentions from verbal and nonverbal human behaviour is critical for everyday social life. Here, we combined Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) with a behavioural priming paradigm to test whether key nodes of the Theory of Mind network (ToMn) contribute to understanding others' intentions by integrating prior knowledge about an agent with the observed action kinematics. We used a modified version of the Faked-Action Discrimination Task (FAD), a forced-choice paradigm in which participants watch videos of actors lifting a cube and judge whether the actors are trying to deceive them concerning the weight of the cube. Videos could be preceded or not by verbal description (prior) about the agent's truthful or deceitful intent. We applied single pulse TMS over three key nodes of the ToMn, namely dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), right posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) and right temporo-parietal junction (rTPJ). Sham-TMS served as a control (baseline) condition. Following sham or rTPJ stimulation, we observed no consistent influence of priors on FAD performance. In contrast, following dmPFC stimulation, and to a lesser extent pSTS stimulation, truthful and deceitful actions were perceived as more deceptive only when the prior suggested a dishonest intention. These findings highlight a functional role of dmPFC and pSTS in coupling prior knowledge about deceptive intents with observed action kinematics in order to judge faked actions. Our study provides causal evidence that fronto-temporal nodes of the ToMn are functionally relevant to mental state inference during action observation.

Response format changes the reading the mind in the eyes test performance of autistic and non-autistic adults.

LAY ABSTRACT: Recognizing and understanding the perspectives of others-also called theory of mind-is important for effective communication. Studies have found that some autistic individuals have greater difficulty with theory of mind compared to non-autistic individuals. One purported theory of mind measure is the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET). This test presents participants with photographs of pairs of eyes and asks them to identify the emotion displayed by each pair of eyes from four choices. Some researchers have argued that the multiple-choice format of the RMET may not be an accurate measure of theory of mind, as participants could simply be guessing or using a process of elimination to select the correct answer. Participants may also be disadvantaged if they are not familiar with the specific emotion words used in the multiple-choice answers. We examined whether a free-report (open-ended) format RMET would be a more valid measure of theory of mind than the multiple-choice RMET. Autistic and non-autistic adults performed better on the multiple-choice RMET than the free-report RMET. However, both versions successfully differentiated autistic and non-autistic adults, irrespective of their level of verbal ability. Performance on both versions was also correlated with another well-validated adult measure of theory of mind. Thus, the RMET's multiple-choice format does not, of itself, appear to underpin its ability to differentiate autistic and non-autistic adults.

Mentalizing in an economic games context is associated with enhanced activation and connectivity in the left temporoparietal junction.

Prior studies in Social Neuroeconomics have consistently reported activation in social cognition regions during interactive economic games, suggesting mentalizing during economic choice. Such mentalizing occurs during active participation in the game, as well as during passive observation of others' interactions. We designed a novel version of the classic false-belief task (FBT) in which participants read vignettes about interactions between agents in the ultimatum and trust games and were subsequently asked to infer the agents' beliefs. We compared activation patterns during the economic games FBT to those during the classic FBT using conjunction analyses. We find significant overlap in the left temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and dorsal medial prefrontal cortex, as well as the temporal pole (TP) during two task phases: belief formation and belief inference. Moreover, generalized Psychophysiological Interaction (gPPI) analyses show that during belief formation, the right TPJ is a target of both the left TPJ and the right TP seed regions, whereas during belief inferences all seed regions show interconnectivity with each other. These results indicate that across different task types and phases, mentalizing is associated with activation and connectivity across central nodes of the social cognition network. Importantly, this is the case for both the novel economic games and the classic FBTs.